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Abstract: In many bargaining situations the decisions that parties take at one point in
time affect their future bargaining opportunities. We consider an ultimatum bargaining
game in which parties can decide not only how to share a current surplus but also how
much to invest in order to generate future surpluses. We show that there is a unique
Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) in which a proposer consumes the whole surplus not
invested. Moreover, when the proposer has a sufficiently high discount factor, his MPE
investment level is higher than his opponent’s, for a given capital stock. Finally, we
show that bargaining can lead to overinvestment.
JEL classification: C61, C72, C73, C78.
Keywords: dynamic accumulation, bargaining, recursive optimisation.
1  Introduction
In many bargaining situations, the decisions that parties take at one point in time affect
the size of future surpluses. For instance, members of a household decide not only how
to allocate current consumption among themselves but also how much to save for
tomorrow’s consumption. Partners in a business need to agree how to share current
profits among themselves, and also whether and how any remaining profit should be re-
invested. Political parties attempt to find agreement over an issue by taking into account
the fact that their current decisions can increase goodwill and facilitate agreement over
issues in the future. Colluding firms can negotiate on how to share current profits
between themselves, while also investing in order to generate profits in the future.
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The aim of this paper is to investigate bargaining games characterised by a dynamic
accumulation problem, that is, players attempt to agree not only on how to share a
surplus but also on the level of investment, which will then affect the capital stock and
the amount of future surpluses. The capital stock we have in mind does not need to be
physical, but can simply reflect the value of the ongoing relationship itself (e.g., it can
represent goodwill generated by the agreement between political parties on some
issues). This implies that our framework can be applied to several bargaining situations.
A dynamic accumulation problem combined with a bargaining process is almost
unexplored in economics. As far as we know, only Muthoo (1999, section 10.3) has
considered the problem of an alternating bargaining process combined with a dynamic
accumulation game. However, he only analyses it as a possible application of an
infinitely repeated game in which two parties share an infinite series of cakes of
constant size (Muthoo, 1995). In other words, players do not choose how much to
invest, as this is exogenously given. For this reason, the problem of how much players
will invest in a bargaining game remains open.
We attempt to address this question, by analysing on an ultimatum bargaining
framework in which players are able to invest part of the surplus. By introducing the
possibility of accumulation, the game is modified in a non-trivial way, in particular, it
can be non-stationary (by stationary game we mean a game characterised by the same
subgame at specific nodes). This implies that the computation of an equilibrium is not
as simple as in the case of a stationary game. Moreover, there can be multiple equilibria
(indeterminacy of equilibria due to non-stationarity has been shown by, for instance,
Binmore, 1987).
The equilibrium concept on which we focus is the Markov subgame perfect
equilibrium (MPE). Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), an MPE is a subgame
perfect equilibrium in which players' strategies are restricted to depend on the past
history of play through the state variable (i.e., Markov strategies). In our case, the state
variable is the capital stock, kt (plus the rules of the game that define the identity of the
proposer). As Maskin and Tirole (2001) point out, this means that only those aspects of
the past that are significant should have an appreciable influence on behaviour.
Moreover, Markov strategies represent the simplest form of behaviour that is consistent
with rationality (Maskin and Tirole, 2001).
The main result of our analysis is that a unique MPE exists. This is characterised by
demands in which the proposer obtains the entire surplus not invested and invests more3
than his opponent would have done if he is sufficiently patient. Within an ultimatum
framework a proposer can focus on his intertemporal optimisation by recognising that in
the future he can propose again (with a positive probability and his opponent can
propose with the complementary probability). Indeed, an acceptance is always obtained,
when a rejection implies the end of the game. However, such an equilibrium is not
specific to ultimatum bargaining, and it can also be sustained under alternative
bargaining procedures (even, a potentially infinite bargaining stage, although in this
case other MPE may exist).
Moreover, we show that bargaining can lead to overinvestment. The intuition is that
since a proposer does not fear a rejection he can, to a large extent, fund the current level
of investment by reducing the responder’s level of consumption below the social
optimum. Additionally, the proposer’s intertemporal optimisation will also take into
account the fact that in the future his opponent enjoys a positive probability of being a
proposer such that the growth path may be different. Within the context of the social
planner’s problem the incentives are different for two reasons. First, both players share
the cost of the investment, second, they equally share the benefits of this investment.
This is why the investment path is lower.
In the following section the model is presented and solved. We then consider the
optimum for the social planner (in section 3). We discuss alternative bargaining
procedures in section 4 and a different equilibrium concept, that is, the stationary
subgame perfect equilibrium in section 5. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 The Game
Two players (for instance, firms, political parties, members of a household, etc.), named
1 and 2, engage in the production of a surplus and its division between themselves. In
particular, having produced a surplus from a given capital stock, the two players bargain
on how much to invest and how to share the consumption of the remaining surplus
between themselves. The level of investment affects the future capital stock and
consequently, the surplus available in the following bargaining stage.
The game then consists of two distinct phases: a production and a bargaining stage.
Each phase can only start when the other has finished. A time period is indicated by t4
with t = 0, 1, …¥. During production, a surplus is generated according to the production
function F(kt) = kt
r, with 0 < r £ 1, where kt is the capital stock at period t. Once the
output is generated, F(kt), the bargaining stage begins, in which players attempt to
divide F(kt). We assume that the bargaining stage is characterised by an ultimatum
procedure. In the first period, t = 0, a bargaining stage starts. The surplus available is
F(k0) = F(1) = 1, by assumption. In general, in period t player 1 (2, respectively) can
become a proposer with probability p (1-p, respectively), with 0 < p < 1. A proposal by
player i is a pair (ixt, iIt), where iIt is the investment level proposed by i at time t and ixt
is the share demanded by i over the remaining surplus at time t. The proposal  ixt,  iIt
depends on capital, denoted by k t. Our notation is simplified, in the sense that the
subscript t indicates the capital stock at t, kt.
On the one hand, if the proposal is accepted, the bargaining stage ends and the
proposer’s current per-period utility is,
ui(ixt,iIt,kt) = [ixt(F(kt) - iIt)]
1-h/(1-h),  (1)
with 0 < h < 1. This is a general utility function: for h that goes to one, the per-period
utility function tends to the logarithmic case, while for h that tends to zero, the utility
becomes linear in consumption (the assumption of linear utility,  h=0, common in
bargaining games, must be excluded for the existence of a solution of the intertemporal
optimisation problem, see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000). Production takes time, t is the
interval of time required to generate surplus. Player i’s time preference is represented by
a between-cake discount factor ai = exp (-rit), where ri is his discount rate. The output
available at the next bargaining stage (at t + 1) is F(kt+1), where kt+1 is the capital stock
in the next period and it is given by the agreed level of investment iIt and the capital
remaining after depreciation, kt+1 = iIt + (1-l) kt, where l is the depreciation rate (0 < l
< 1).
On the other hand, if there is a rejection, the game finishes and the players get zero
payoffs. Therefore, in the case of rejection it is not only the surplus F(kt) that disappears
but also the capital stock kt. For instance, suppose that two colluding firms get zero
profits if they cease to collaborate. One reason could be that they compete à la Bertrand
and there is no second-hand market for k t. Then, if the firms do not have frequent
contacts, tacit collusion might be difficult to sustain. We can assume that as soon as one5
of the colluding firms rejects a proposal, the collaborative relationship is compromised.
We can also think of the capital stock kt as not being physical but simply reflecting the
investment in the relationship itself. For instance, suppose in a country a dictatorial
regime has been just defeated. However, democracy is not well-established, and the new
political parties attempt to build it up. Then, if they do not reach an agreement quickly
on political issues, their political future can be completely compromised by a new
dictatorial regime.
The case in which, after a rejection, only the surplus at that stage disappears (F(kt)),
but not the capital (kt) is interesting but technically more demanding and we discuss it in
section 3. We now turn to discuss the MPE’s in the case in which a rejection implies the
end of the game.
2.1  The Equilibrium
First of all, if an MPE exists in this framework, it must be without delay (if an MPE
with delay is assumed to exist, then it can be shown that a profitable deviation exists, so
that the strategies which defined such a delay cannot sustain an MPE). Then, to define
an MPE, we need to solve the following problem. The proposer at time t, say i (with i
=1,2), must maximise his expected discounted utility, v i(kt), with respect to the share of
the surplus he demands for his consumption  ixt and the amount of the surplus to be
invested iIt, with 0 £ ixt £ 1 and 0 £ iIt £ F(kt). Player i’s expected discounted utility at
time t is given by his current per-period utility, u i(ixt,iIt,kt), plus the future expected
utility, E s￿sai
t+sui(zxt+s,zIt+s,kt+s), where the per-period utility u i(zxt+s,zIt+s,kt+s) is defined
in (1), with z proposing at t+s, z = 1,2 and s = 1,2,…. The expectation is taken with
respect to the probabilities of becoming a proposer at t+s. Since the identity of a
proposer at one point time affects the future investment strategies via the agreed level of



















++- ￿￿ ￿ (2)
where each element of a potential history h
t, h, is equal to pi assuming player i proposes
and (1-pi) when player j is assumed to propose (except for the unique element of h
t+1\h
t,
that is 1 by assumption) for t =1, 2…¥. The potential history h
t uniquely indicates the6
sequence of proposers to reach the node t from 1, where the nodes considered are only
the ones in which an offer is to be made. These are numbered sequentially from 1. At
each node there are two possibilities either i or j will propose next, in each period the
lowest number is given to the node where i will propose next. Accordingly, the product
of the elements of h
t (￿h) gives the probability of reaching node t from node 1, while h
t
as a superscript of kt indicates the actual history of proposals which defines the capital
stock at time t.
Similarly, the expected discounted utility of a responder who accepts player i’s


















++- ￿￿ ￿ (3)
Player i's proposal is accepted immediately if and only if the responder obtains at least
as much as he would get in the case of rejection, which is zero in this case (i.e., w j(kt) ‡
0). Then, a proposer maximisation problem is given by,
Since an MPE is characterised by a time invariant rule mapping the state variable kt into
the decision variables ixt and iIt, then the problem can be written in a recursive form (the





































(1)   in case of acceptance
with
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for ij, and i, j = 1,2. „
1
ij1
(1)   in case of acceptance
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where Vi(kt) is the optimum v i(kt) or value function, and Wi(kt) is the optimal expected
utility when player i is a responder, w i(kt). Condition (5) guarantees that the proposal at
time t is accepted immediately. However, this is always satisfied since  ixt belongs to
[0,1] and iIt to [0, kt]. The indifference conditions are important instruments in deriving
the solution of bargaining problems with a stationary structure. In our (non-stationary)
game, the indifference conditions, which are (5) as an equality, cannot hold (unless the
between cake discount factors ai are zero). When there is accumulation a responder is
able to obtain a positive surplus at some point in the future, and therefore his optimal
expected utility Wi(kt) can be strictly positive
1.
Since any investment decision made by a player at time t, affects the whole stream of
future profits (by the equation of motion), the bargaining stages are strongly
interconnected even within a simplified bargaining structure such as the ultimatum
framework. Given the ultimatum structure, the focus is on an MPE in which a proposer
is able to consume the whole portion of the surplus not invested, in other words a






















1 (1)   in case of acceptance and 0 otherwise ttit kI k l + =-+ (7)
To solve the problem we use the guess and verify method. This consists in ‘guessing’
the form of the value function but leaving the coefficients undetermined, and then
‘verifying the guess’ by showing that there are values of the coefficients that make the
guess correct. The guess and verify method relies on the uniqueness of the solution.
This is ensured by the assumption of concave utility functions, a linear production
function (F(kt) = kt) and a linear equation of motion (see Stokey, Lucas and Prescott,
1993 or Levhari and Srinivasant, 1969). Our ‘guess’ is that the value function is a
function of the capital stock of the same form as the utility function. Then the players'
optimisation problem can be written as follows,
fi kt
1-h /(1-h) = max ict
1-h/(1-h) + ai bi kt+1
1-h /(1-h) w.r.t. ict, (8)
                                                                
1 In our framework, the equilibrium shares ix t cannot be larger than one. In other words, we exclude the
case in which a proposer can extract all his opponent’s expected discounted utility in the case of
acceptance,  Wj(kt). This case, even though interesting, complicates the analysis, because it requires8
where kt+1 = kt(2 - l) – ict if there is an acceptance, 0 otherwise.  (9)
bi = pifi + (1- pi) mi  (10)
with ict equal to the consumption level proposed by player i (i.e., kt - iIt) and pj = 1 – pi,
pi in [0,1], with i = 1, 2. The coefficients fi and mi, and consequently bi with i =1,2, are
undefined at this point. The expected maximum discounted utility of a responder at time
t, mi kt
1-h /(1-h) is given by,
mi kt
1-h /(1-h) = 0 + ai [(1- pi) mi/(1-h) + pifi /(1 - h)] (jj
 kt) 
1-h  (11)
where jj kt is the capital stock at time t +1, after player j has been a proposer at time t.
The FOC for the problem (8) – (10) is the following,
ict
-h - ai bi (kt (2-l) – ict)
-h = 0, (12)
which implies,
ict = (2-l) kt /(1 + ai 
1/hbi
1/h).  (13)
Optimal consumption is a linear function of the capital stock. Moreover, if the expected
utility in the continuation game (ai bi) is higher for a given level of capital stock, a
proposer consumes less and invests more. Using (13), the equation of motion can be
written as,
kt+1 = ji
 kt, where ji = (2-l) ai 
1/hbi
1/h/(1 + ai 
1/hbi
1/h).  (14)
After the guess, it is necessary to verify that there is a solution for the coefficients, fi,
mi such that they are well defined. By using (13), (10) and (11) are two equations in the
two undefined coefficients, fi and mi. Then, if there is a solution to this system, the
guess was right and the verification phase ends. The solution of the system (10) and
(11) also gives the optimal investment path. Moreover, this solution is unique. We show
                                                                                                                                                                                             
another state variable apart from the capital stock to keep track of the responder’s expected payoff before
making an offer.9
the conditions under which the solution exists. This is sufficient to complete the
verification.
The solution to the problem is completed with another constraint, the so-called
transversality condition, which imposes that at the limit as t tends to zero the utility
value of the discounted capital stock (ai
t kt dVi(kt)/dkt) goes to zero (the transversality




1-h = 0 as t ﬁ ¥ for any i = 1,2. (15)
The solution to the problem (8) – (10) given the constraint (15) is characterised by
the following remark and proposition.
Remark 1:  In this game, a unique MPE can be established under the conditions
identified in Appendix A.
Proposition 1: In the unique MPE, there is a player who invests more, for a given
capital stock kt. This player is characterised by possessing a sufficiently high between-
cake discount factor.
Proof: From Appendix A, in general in equilibrium there is a player, say i, such that
ai > ajyj/yi. From (1.5) in Appendix A, this implies that fi > fj. Then, from the FOC,
player i has a smaller consumption level than j, for a given capital stock kt, if aibi > ajbj.
But this inequality holds, since bi = yifi and aiyifi > ajyjfj. Then player i successfully
proposes to invest more for a given capital stock, when ai > ajyj/yi.
￿
Given the ultimatum procedure, a proposer can optimise his expected utility without
fearing a rejection in equilibrium. Since in general there is a player who minds
relatively more about the future, such a player invests more than his opponent, given the
capital stock kt. As a result the growth path is higher and when at one point in the future
this player will propose again he will be able to extract a larger surplus.
In spite of the simplicity of the bargaining structure, an explicit solution of the
accumulation problem is not straightforward. However, the existence, uniqueness and
characterisation of the MPE can be established. Moreover, for the special case of h = ½10
a more detailed analysis can be done. We conclude this section with the results of the
model when players still have concave utility function but in a specific form, h = ½.
Lemma 1: In the case of symmetry, that is ai = a, di = d and pi = ½ for any i, with h
= ½, for a(2-l)
1/2 < 1, there is a unique MPE. This is characterised by the investment
plan (13) with coefficients defined as follows,













In the case of symmetry, the unique MPE is symmetric. Moreover, when the production
becomes quicker (a increases) a proposer consumes less and invests more (by using
(13), (16) and (17), since the solution (y1, y2) is an increasing function of the between-
cake discount factor a). Indeed, in this case the future becomes more important to
players and therefore the investment path is higher so that in the future a proposer can
extract larger surpluses.
When the symmetry assumption is relaxed the computation of the equilibrium (in
particular y*j for j=1,2) is less straightforward (in particular, if a component of the pair
(y*1,  y*2) belongs to T i, the other component may not belong to T j, then the
equilibrium is undefined for i, j = 1,2 and i „ j). However, despite the existence of an
extreme asymmetry between players a simple example in which there is still a solution,
is when at the limit, one of the players, say 1, has a very high probability to propose, pi
tends to 1. In this case, the unique real solution is defined by y1 = 1 and y2 = 0, with l
sufficiently high ((2-l)
1/2ai < 1, for i = 1,2 where the relevant interval for y*i is T i equal
to [pi, min{((2- l)
1/2ai)
-1,((2-l)ajai)
-1})). Indeed, the overall payoff to player 1 as a
proposer is as the payoff in the continuation game, for a given capital stock (i.e., bi =
fi). If player 2 becomes a responder (even though with a probability that tends to zero)
his expected payoff is zero (m2 = 0).11
2.2 A Note on the Linear-Quadratic Form
The most studied recursive optimisation problems are linear quadratic, (i.e., the
constraint is a linear function of the state variable and the per-period objective function
is quadratic), since such problems are characterised by a simple solution (the ‘guess’ is
not required, as the solution is known to be linear, see Ljugqvist and Sargent, 2000).
Our bargaining problem with dynamic accumulation can also be transformed into the
linear quadratic form. Indeed, the model can be expressed in term of differences
between the actual and an unreachable target and players minimise a quadratic loss
function with respect to the difference between the actual level of consumption and a
target level. It can be shown that this transformation does not change the qualitative
results established in Remark 1 and Proposition 1 (see Flamini, 2002). The only
simplification is in the analytical derivation of the conditions for the existence of a
solution. However, since in classic bargaining theory players have concave/linear utility
functions  rather than quadratic loss functions, we prefer to maintain the standard
framework.
3 The Social Planner’s Accumulation Plan
In this section, we show that if there  was a social planner, able to choose the
consumption and investment level for the two players, he would invest more than the
non-cooperative players, if their between-cake discount factors are sufficiently small.
Moreover, instead of leaving the whole consumable surplus to a player, the social
planner would divide it equally between players (given the symmetry of players’ per-
period utility).
To prove this we first solve the social planner’s optimisation problem. We then
compare the social optimum with the MPE investment level. To simplify the problem
players are symmetric. The social planner’s optimisation problem is a classic growth
problem, where the optimal consumption plan is to divide the surplus equally among
players (since players are symmetric). The optimum investment plan is given by the



















where,  fS is the undefined coefficient of the value function related to the social
planner’s problem. This is a standard recursive accumulation problem. It can be shown
(e.g., in Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000) that the optimal investment plan for social
planner, It, is given by,
It = kt [a(2- l)
1-h]
1/h,   with a(2- l) < 1. (19)
Therefore, the social planner invests more if the depreciation rate decreases and/or the
production becomes quicker (a increases).
To facilitate the comparison between the growth path with and without bargaining,
we assume that h = ½. Then, the social optimum in (19) is as follows,
It = kt [a
2(2- l)], with a(2- l) < 1 (20)
While using  (13), the optimum non-cooperative investment level in the case of
symmetry with h = ½ is given by,




2),  with a = ai and bi = b for any i. (21)
The social planner’s level of investment is at least as large as the non-cooperative level
if the following inequality holds,
[a





Then, it is sufficient to show that b
2(1-a







2) with y = (1-(1-(2-l)a
2)
1/2)/(2-l)a
2 < 1 and (2-l)a
2 < 1.
That is to say, y
2(2-l) £ 1￿ (2-l)a
2 £ 2(2-l)
1/2 - (2-l) < 1. Then, for a
2 £ 2/(2-l)
1/2 –1,




1/2, the non-cooperative players invest more. Since for the existence of an
1 (1)        with i  j and i, j = 1,2  ttt kkI l + =-+„13
MPE the depreciation rate l has to be sufficiently large (see lemma 1), then we focus on
the case of l which tends to 1. In this case, the social planner always invests less than
the non-cooperative players.  The intuition is that since a proposer does not fear a
rejection, he can to a large extent fund the current level of investment by reducing the
responder’s level of consumption below the social optimum. Additionally, the
proposer’s intertemporal optimisation will also take into account the fact that in the
future his opponent can propose with a positive probability and therefore his
consumption will be very different (moreover, the growth path will differ when players
are not symmetric). In the context of the social planner’s problem the incentives are
different for two reasons. First, both players share the cost of the investment; second,
they equally share the benefits of this investment.
These results are related the conventional  hold up problem, in which there is
underinvestment since a player incurs all the costs of investment but cannot appropriate
all the benefits from the bargaining process. In our framework, the asymmetry is
different, within an ultimatum procedure, there is a player who is able not only to
extract all the surplus, but also to impose part of the investment costs on his opponent.
Then, if the proposer is sufficiently patient he will overinvest to extract subsequent
surpluses in the future
2. Clearly, another relevant difference between the conventional
hold-up problem and our game is that in the latter the accumulation problem is dynamic
(repeated more than once).
4  The Bargaining Procedure
The bargaining procedure in our model is relatively simple. The assumption that the
game ends in the case of rejection allowed us to tackle the accumulation problem that
the players face. Consider the two following alternatives. In the first one, we assume
that only the surplus disappears after a rejection, but a new production stage can take
place. Then, capital depreciates and the new capital stock is kt+1 = (1-l)kt. In the second
alternative, players play the bargaining stage (potentially forever) until an agreement is
reached - either as in Rubinstein (1982) with an alternating-offer structure or with
random proposers. In this case there is no production (and therefore no depreciation)14
after a rejection. As a result the capital stock in the next bargaining round is simply kt.
As a result, the two cases are very similar in terms of the continuation game, since there
is still a positive capital stock after a rejection. This feature makes the problem
technically very demanding, since the optimisation for a proposer who attempts to make
an acceptable offer is now constrained by the acceptance condition. In other words, a
proposer’s problem has a recursive structure which includes a constraint, the acceptance
condition, which in turn embodies another recursive problem (i.e., the responder
optimisation problem in the case of rejection). The solution of a recursive problem
constrained by another recursive problem is unsolved as far as we know. It is possible to
show that there is an MPE like the one defined for the ultimatum structure if the
constraint is not binding (at all points in time and for each player). However, many
MPE (with and without delay) can also be sustained, given the non-stationary structure
of the game. In an ultimatum bargaining framework this feature does not hold (a
proposer can focus on his intertemporal optimisation without fearing a rejection).
In conclusion, a dynamic accumulation problem within a bargaining game is often
intractable. The problem becomes tractable, when either the bargaining stage is simple
(as the one considered in section 2) or the accumulation problem is simplified (as shown
in the following section).
5 The Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
In this section, the focus is on a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE). In other
words, we solve the game for the case in which the state variable is constant (i.e., iIt =
ktl for any t). We consider a classic bargaining stage in which after a rejection, a player
can make another proposal with a positive probability
3. For this game we show that
there is a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE). The proposer’s share
of consumable surplus in the SSPE is larger than the share defined by the social planner.
Let di be the within-cake discount factor of player i. In other words, if at period t
there is a rejection, a time interval D passes and a new period (t+1) starts. Since the time
                                                                                                                                                                                             
2 In the hold-up problem overinvestment can take place when players have a matching problem (see, Cole
at al, 2001) or the investment cost is not sunk (Muthoo, 1996).
3 Within an ultimatum framework the problem is banal, since a proposer can extract all the surplus not
invested and the level of investment is exogenously given (iIt = ktl).15
periods now have different lengths, defined either by the production time interval t or
by a bargaining delay  D, with D < t, these are accounted for by different discount
factors. Player i’s time preferences are represented not only by a between-cake discount
factor ai = exp (-rit) - which applies after an acceptance - but also by a within-cake
discount factor di = exp (-riD) - which applies after a rejection. As in section 2, we
assume that capital does not depreciate during the bargaining process, but only during
production.
An SSPE is characterised by a level of investment such that the capital stock is
unchanged over time, i.e., iIt = ktl for any t. Since investment is exogenously given the
model resembles Muthoo's game (1999, 1995), with the difference that we consider a
random proposer and a more general utility function. First, the SSPE is characterised in
the symmetric case (in which players have identical time preferences and probabilities
to propose) and then for players with linear utility functions.




1-h], if d >a, otherwise xi = 1, where d and a are the
common discount factors.
Proof: The proof follows standard arguments (see Muthoo, 1995). Let V i (Wi,
respectively) be the equilibrium payoff in any subgame beginning with player i's
demand (offer), then, V i = (p xi) 
1-h/(1-h) + ai (piVi + (1-pi) Wi) and Wi = (p(1-xi))
1-h /
(1-h) + ai (piVi + (1-pi) Wi), where p indicates the share of the surplus available for
consumption (p = k0(1-l)), with i = 1, 2. This implies that for such an equilibrium it
must be true that,
Vi = p
1-h [xi 
1-h(1- ai (1-pi)) + ai (1-pi)(1- xi)
1-h ]/ (1-h)(1-ai), (23)
Wi = p
1-h [(1-xi)
1-h(1- ai pi) + aipi xi
1-h ]/(1-h)(1-ai), (24)
Moreover, it must be the case that a player accepts an offer if and only if his payoff in




1-h/(1 -h) ‡ (dj -aj) (pjVj + (1- pj) Wj), for any i, j = 1, 2 with i „ j.  (25)16
Since, by assumption, the within-cake discount factor di is larger than the between-cake
discount factor ai, the inequality above holds as an equality, as, in equilibrium, player i
demands for the largest acceptable share (when dj £ aj, xi = 1). By using (23) and (24),
the indifference conditions become,
(1-xi)
1-h = (dj -aj) ((1-pj) (1-xj)
1-h + pjxj
1-h)/(1-aj),  for any i, j = 1,2 with i „ j. (26)
This is a system of two equations in two unknowns, x i and x j. Its solution is not
straightforward, unless we focus on a symmetric solution or h assumes a specific value
(the simplest case can be obtained for linear utility, h = 0). In a symmetric case (ai = a,




1-h]. In appendix C, the uniqueness of the SSPE demands is proven for the case
where h = 0. Since when h > 0 the arguments are very similar, the proof is omitted.
￿
Lemma 2:  When players have linear utility functions ( h = 0). The unique SSPE
strategies are as follows, player i asks for a share equal to xi, and accepts any demand
not larger than xj with i, j=1,2 and i„ j where,
x1 = [1-a1-d2(1-d1)-a2(d1-a1)-p(d2 -a2) (1-d1 + 2(d1- a1)(1-p))] /D,
x2 = [(1-a1)(1- a2) + p (d1 -a1)((2p - 1)(d2 - a2) –(1- a2))]/D,  (27)
where D = (1-a1)(1- a2) + (d1 -a1)(d2 - a2)(1- 4p(1-p)).
Proof: This case is similar to Muthoo's model where the investment level is exogenous.
The only difference is that the proposer is randomly chosen. The proof is in appendix C.
￿
In the symmetric case (Proposition 2), a player can obtain more within a random-
proposer framework than he could within an alternating structure (such as that in
Muthoo, 1995, 1999). The random proposer mechanism makes a proposer stronger (this
characteristic does not always hold when players differ). Moreover, the SSPE demands
x and x i are not smaller than ½. This implies that in the non-cooperative structure
proposers are able to obtain a share larger than the one defined by the social planner.17
6  Conclusion
As far as we know our model is the first attempt to solve an accumulation problem
within a bargaining model. This is characterised by parties who need to agree not only
on how divide a surplus for their consumption, but also on how much to invest, which
affects the size of surpluses available in the future. When a rejection of a proposal
induces the end of the game, we showed that there is a unique Markov perfect
equilibrium (MPE) in which a proposer consumes the whole surplus not invested. This
equilibrium can also be sustained under more complicated bargaining procedures (for
instance in a potentially infinite bargaining game, or when a production stage follows
the rejection of a proposal). However, in these cases the analytical solution of the
recursive optimisation problem is technically very demanding, since the maximisation
problem of a proposer embodies another recursive problem (via a constraint). Only
when the bargaining stage is simple or the investment level is exogenously given, as in
the SSPE, can a full characterisation of the solution be derived.
We showed that when the proposer has a sufficiently high discount factor, his MPE
investment level is higher than his opponent’s, for a given capital stock. Moreover, it is
larger than the optimal level of investment chosen by a social planner. In other words,
bargaining leads to overinvestment, in contrast to the common view of the hold-up
problem. This is due to the fact that within the ultimatum framework a proposer is able
to focus on his (intertemporal) optimisation problem without fearing a rejection in
equilibrium. Since the cost of investing are to a large extent incurred by the responder,
then a proposer who minds about the future will invest more, so as to extract large
surpluses in the future. In the social planner’s problem this incentive does not exist,
since all the asymmetries between players are eliminated.
In general, the capital stock in our framework does not need to be physical, but can
simply derive from the ongoing relationship itself. Therefore, this framework can
represent an important first step for further investigation of the dynamic accumulation
problem in many bargaining situations.18
Appendix A
Proof of Remark 1. This proof extends results contained in Lockwood et al. (1996) in
several respects. Lockwood et al. do not deal with a bargaining problem. Moreover,
their players possess the same rate of time preference and face a linear-quadratic
problem which is the simplest form that the optimisation problem can assume.
Using (13) and the equation of motion, after some manipulations, problem (8) can be
written as,
fi = (2 - l)
1-h (1 + ai
1/hbi
1/h)
h.    (A.1)
Moreover, (11) can be written explicitly for mi for any i = 1,2,
mi = ai pifijj
 1-h/ (1 - ai(1-pi) jj
 1-h).  (A.2)
By using (A.2), (10) can be solved for bi,
bi = yifi, where yi = pi/(1-ai(1-pi)(jj)
1-h). (A.3)
By using (A.3), (A.1) becomes an equation in fi,
fi = (2 - l)





The solution to (A.4) is the following,
fi = (2 - l)
1-h /(1 – (2-l)




Using (A.5) and bi = yifi, j
i as defined in (14), can be written as follows,




This implies that yi in (A.3) can be written as a function of yj,19
yi = pi / (1-ai
1/h(1-pi)(2 - l)
(1-h) / h yj 
(1-h)/ h). (A.7)
System (A.7) consists of two equations in two unknowns yi and yj. If there is a solution
(y*1, y*2) to (A.7), then this implies a solution to (A.5) and (A.3). Consequently, mi is
also well defined. Since by definition, bi = pifi + (1-pi)mi, by using (A.3),
mi = (yi – pi)fi /(1-pi). (A.8)
The equilibrium is then characterised by  (A.3),  (A.5), (A.7), (A.8), the transversality
condition. Moreover, we impose that fi ‡ 0, bi ‡ 0 and mi ‡ 0. If there is a solution to
(A.7), which respects all these constraints, we call it the ‘non-negative equilibrium’.
ii) Uniqueness of the non-negative solution (y*1, y*2).
System (A.7) can be written as a pair of equations where yi is the explicit variable. That
is to say,
yi = fi(yj) = pi / (1- ai
 yj 
(1-h)/ h)
yi = fj(yj) = (yj – pj)
h/(1-h) / (ajyj 
h/(1-h)),
with ai = ai
1/h(1-pi)(2 - l)
(1-h) / h and aj = aj
1/(1-h)(1-pj)
h/(1-h)(2 - l), with i „ j and i, j = 1,2.
We now investigate the properties of the two functions f and define under which
conditions there is a unique non-negative equilibrium. First of all, note that the function
fi is increasing in yj, with a discontinuity at  dyj = 1/ai. Moreover, the function f i is
negative for  yj larger than  dyj. However, for the non-negative constraints and the
requirement of a finite value function, it must be that the upper bound for yj is dyj. On
the other hand, a lower bound for yi is pi, since fi(0) = pi. Regarding function fj, this is
increasing in yj, with an upper bound in dyi = 1/aj. Moreover, f j(pj) = 0. This implies
that the function f i must be convex (its second derivative is positive), while f j must be
concave (its second derivative is negative) between pj and dyj. Given the properties of
the functions fi, with i =1,2, these intersect at most twice in the space [pi, dyi) x [pj, dyj).
An intersection point is indicated by y* = (y1*, y*2).20
We now refine the space of interest for the solution (y1*, y*2) to take into account
the constraints that a non-negative equilibrium must satisfy. Namely, condition  (15),
and the non negative-constraints. Note that the condition of immediate acceptance is
equal to the non-negative constraints mi ‡ 0 for any i. The lower bound for yj is simply
LByj = pj. A necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium is that LByi < UByi,
where the upper bound UByj is defined below.
By using (A.5) and the non-negative condition for bj, yj must be smaller than uyj =
1/[(2-l)
1-haj], with j=1,2. Moreover, the transversality condition is satisfied if aijj
(1-h) <
1, with
4 jj = max {j1, j2}, for any i, j = 1, 2. This implies yj < TCyj = 1/[aj(2-l)ai
h/(1-h)]
with i, j = 1,2. In conclusion the upper bound for yj is UByj = min { dyj, uyj, TCyj}. A
solution to the system yi = f i(yj), yi = f j(yj), say, (y*1, y*2), implies a non-negative
equilibrium, if it lies in the space T = T 1xT2, with T i = [ LByi, UByi). A solution must
satisfy the following equation,
piajyj 
h/(1-h) = (yj – pj)
h/(1-h) (1 - ai
 yj 
(1-h)/ h). (A.9)
This is an equation of degree (h/(1-h))
2 + 1 if  h > ½ and ((1-h)/h)
2 + 1 otherwise.
However, even though this implies that (A.9) is an equation of degree higher than 2, in
the space of interest for a non-negative equilibrium, T, there are at most two
intersections, given the properties of the function fi's, with i =1,2. A necessary condition
to obtain at least two solutions is that pi is smaller than  dyi. That is to say piai < 1, for i
=1,2. Additionally, we require that the two functions, fi for any i, are sufficiently curved
so that they cross at least once. An explicit solution for a general  h is not
straightforward. We investigate the existence of a non-negative equilibrium in more
detail when h assumes a specific value, h = ½ (see Appendix B). For the general case,
we can conclude that if the two functions, f i for any i, cross once, at y*, then there is a






+y*2), then there is a unique solution if either 
-y* or 
+y* is in T.
The solution to (A.9) are characterised by 
+y*i ‡ 
-y*i and i = 1,2 (see figure 1 below).
Since from (A.5), fi is an increasing function of yi, given (A.3) and (A.8), this implies
that bi and mi are increasing with respect to yi, for any i. Then, a solution defined by
                                                                
4 This is a stronger condition, it is sufficient ai(pjjj
 + piji)
(1-h)  < 1.21
+y* is superior to a solution defined by 
-y*. However, if these are in T, the guess and





     dyi
        pi
           0 pj                         
dyj
Figure 1: Representation of system (A.9).
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 1. When h = ½, the equation (A.9) can be written as follows,
aiyj 
2 - (1- ajpi + aipj) yj + pj = 0. (B.1)
There are at most two positive solutions to (B.1) if (i) (1- ajpi + aipj) > 0 (following the
Descartes' rules of signs) and (ii) the discriminant of (2.1), D, is non-negative. Condition
(i) can also be written as b > 0, where





Then (i) is guaranteed by pi £ ½ and ai ‡ aj. Regarding (ii), after some manipulation the




2 – 2ai (2-l)
1/2 (ai(2-l)
1/2 – 1)pi + (ai(2-l)
1/2 – 1)
2.22
In addition to the condition for (i), D is positive for any p, if ai £ (2-l)
-1/2. Since if ai >
(2-l)
-1/2 then (ii) requires that p must be sufficiently small
5, to simplify let ai be smaller
than (2-l)
-1/2. To sum up, a necessary solution for a positive solution to (B.1), is pi £ 1/2
and aj£ ai £ (2-l)
-1/2.
The solutions to (B.1) are as follows,
y*j = [b – ￿D]/2ai with i, j =1, 2 and i „ j.  (B.2)





Under symmetry (i.e., ai = aj = a and pi = ½), the solutions are as follows,
y*j = [1 – ￿(1- a
2(2-l))]/a
2(2-l). (B.3)
These are real if ai
2(2-l) < 1. Then, the non-negative equilibrium is given by 
-y*j since
this belongs to T j while 
+y*j does not, where T j = T i = (½, 1/(a(2-l)
1/2)). Moreover,
since the equilibrium is defined by 
-y*
 < 1, the payoff to a proposer is higher than the
payoff to a responder for a given level of capital (i.e., fi > bi, then fi > mi for any i).
Appendix C
Proof of Corollary 1: To prove the uniqueness of the SSPE demand defined by (27), it
is necessary to prove that any SSPE is characterised by immediate agreement. Since
after an acceptance or a rejection the capital stock is unchanged, we need to check that a
one-shot deviation is not profitable. We now show that if there was a SSPE with delay,
then there is at least one profitable deviation.
Let x*i be the equilibrium demand by player i, in a SSPE with delay, then this is such
that player j always rejects such a demand. If a rejection is profitable for player j then
the following must hold,
p(1-x*i) + aj(pjVj +(1-pj)Wj) < dj(pjVj +(1-pj)Wj), (C.1)
                                                                
5 It must be p < (2-l)
1/2 (ai(2-l)
1/2 – 1)(ai -aj)/(2-l)(ai
2- aj
2 ) < 1/2.23
where p indicates the consumable share of the cake (i.e., (1-l)k0). If (dj < aj, there is a
contradiction) dj ‡ aj, there will be a contradiction if there is a one-shot deviation by
player i, in which player i asks for x'i, this is immediately accepted by player j and the
deviation is profitable to player i. That is to say, x'i is characterised by the following
inequalities.
p(1-x'i) + aj(pjVj +(1-pj)Wj) ‡ dj(pjVj +(1-pj)Wj), (C.2)
px'i + ai(piVi +(1-pi)Wi) ‡ di(piVi +(1-pi)Wi). (C.3)
These inequalities define an interval, say X', in which x'i varies. Then it is always
possible to define the deviation x'i if the interval X'i exists. That is to say,
p ‡  (di - ai)(piVi +(1-pi)Wi) +(dj+ aj)(pjVj +(1-pj)Wj). (C.4)
It is possible to distinguish two cases: either player j's offer is always rejected or not. In
the former, Vi = Wi = Vj = Wj = 0. Then the interval X'i exists. In the latter, since player
i's is always rejected, while player j's offer is always accepted, the following holds.
Vj = xjp + aj(pjVj +(1-pj)Wj), (C.5)
Wi = p(1-xj ) + ai(piVi +(1-pi)Wi), (C.6)
Wj = dj (pjVj +(1-pj)Wj), (C.7)
Vi = di (piVi +(1-pi)Wi),  (C.8)
which implies,
Vi = (1- xj)p di (1-pi) /(1- pidi -aipj), (C.9)
Wi = (1- xj)p (1-di pi) /(1- pidi -aipj), (C.10)
Wj = xj p dj pj /(1- ajpj - djpi), (C.11)
Vj = xj p (1-dj(1- pj)/(1- ajpj - djpi). (C.12)
By using these equations, the condition for the existence of X'i can then be written as
follows,24
p ‡  (di - ai)Vi /di + (dj - aj)Vj / dj.  (C.13)
That is to say,
1 ‡ pj xj (Aj - Ai) + Ai ￿   1 - Ai ‡ pj xj (Aj - Ai),   (C.14)
where A j = (dj - aj)/(1- ajpj - djpi) and similarly for A i. Since A i and A j are always
smaller than 1, then the above inequality holds. In other words, X'i is not empty and
therefore a SSPE characterised by delay cannot exist. If the SSPE is without delay, then
it is characterised by (27) and it is unique.
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